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11 Introduction
Employers in developed countries are often thought to beneﬁtf r o ml a b o r
immigration. If this were in fact the case, we would expect them to be
more supportive of immigration than the rest. The literature on individual
attitudes toward immigration has not paid attention to employers so far.
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap. We examine the data on individuals
in the European Union member states from Round 1 of the European Social
Survey (ESS hereafter) that was conducted during the pre-2004 enlargement
period.
The view that immigration is economically beneﬁcial for employers is very
common. For instance, Richard Layard at London School of Economics
wrote a couple of years before the enlargement, “For European employers
..., unskilled immigration brings real advantages. It provides labour for
their restaurants, building sites and car parks and helps to keep these ser-
vices cheap by keeping down the wages of those who work there.”1 See also
Solé and Parella (2003) who describe why employers would prefer immigrant
workers to native workers in Spain.
While this economic logic makes us believe that employers are in favor of
more liberal labor immigration, it has not been empirically examined whether
or not the status of being an employer makes a diﬀerence in terms of pref-
erences for immigration restriction. The literature on individual attitudes
toward immigration has so far examined two channels through which immi-
gration is thought to aﬀe c tp e o p l ee c o n o m i c a l l yi nt h eh o s tc o u n t r i e s . O n ei s
1Al e t t e rt oFinancial Times “Conﬂict between Europe and immigrant workers” pub-
lished on 15 May 2002
2the factor market, and the other is the welfare state.2 The inﬂuence of labor
market eﬀects of immigration on individual attitudes has been examined by
Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Citrin et al. (1997), Bauer et al. (2000),
Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Dustmann and Preston (2004), Mayda (2006)
and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006). However, the main focus has been on
attitudes of native labor suppliers. Individual attitudes on the demand side
of the labor market have probably been thought too obvious to be studied
so far.
Our results do not conﬁrm that employers were more pro-immigration
than the rest by reasoning that immigration would reduce the cost of labor.
Exceptions are sanitation-related activities such as sewage and refuse disposal
and recreational, cultural and sports activities. In these sectors, we ﬁnd
that employers were less likely to prefer immigration restriction than the rest
among those who anticipated a wage fall due to immigration. In Austria,
employers were more pro-immigration than the rest, but we do not conﬁrm
that this is due to the wage eﬀect of immigration.
We also ﬁnd that, contrary to our expectation, employers were more,
rather than less, likely to be anti-immigration than the rest in sectors where
foreign workers were highly present, such as household activities, construc-
tion, wholesale, hotels and restaurants.
The next section derives hypotheses by using a simple model. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 presents results. Section 5 concludes.
2The inﬂuence of public ﬁnance eﬀects of immigration on individual preferences were
examined by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Citrin et al. (1997), Dustmann and
Preston (2004), Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006).
32T h e o r y
Consider a sector with N>0 identical producers. The output by each pro-





where l and k denote labor and capital, respectively, and α ∈ (0,1).I n t h e
short run, k>0 is ﬁxed. With r denoting the unit price of capital, rk is
the ﬁxed cost.




π(q(l),l) ≡ pq (l) − wl − rk (2)





where l  denotes the optimal amount of labor. By rearranging this equation,





3To ensure that the producers are operating in the market, we assume that π(l0) ≥− rk,
or equivalently p ≥ wl0/q (l0),h o l d sw i t hl0 > 0 denoting the labor input per producer
without immigration.
4By substituting this into the production function (1), we get the following
supply function:
q
  (p,w) ≡ k(αp/w)
α
1−α (5)
Suppose the sector is open, and the production in the country does not
aﬀect the output price in the world. However, the wage is determined in the
national labor market.
With N identical producers, the sectoral demand for labor in the country
is Nl . Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and there are
L>0 sector-speciﬁc workers in the country. In equilibrium, Nl  = L or
equivalently
w
  (N,L) ≡ αp(Nk/L)
1−α (6)
which suggests that the wage is decreasing in labor supply and increasing in
the number of producers.
By substituting the supply function (5), the labor demand (4) and the
equilibrium wage (6), we get
π
  (N,L) ≡ (1 − α)pl
 αk
1−α − rk (7)
where l  = L/N.T h e ﬁr s tt e r mi st h es u mo ft h eﬁr s ta n dt h es e c o n d
terms in (2), which simply indicates that a fraction α of the total revenue is
distributed to workers.
The proﬁt function (7) suggests the following:
5• Employers are more pro-immigration than the rest ceteris paribus be-
cause proﬁt is increasing in the supply of labor: ∂π /∂L > 0.
This is the main logic behind the argument that immigration would ben-
eﬁt employers. Note, for some producers/sectors, immigration may not
increase L perhaps because migrant labor is not useful input in production.
Then, ∂π /∂L > 0 is irrelevant.4
Equation (7) also suggests the following:
• Employers are less pro-immigration than the rest ceteris paribus be-
cause proﬁt is decreasing in the number of employers: ∂π /∂N < 0.
Thus, if immigrants increase the number of producers, employers would
oppose such an inﬂow into the country. In Section 4, we ﬁnd some evidence
to suggest employers’ concern with this negative eﬀect.
3D a t a
ESS Round 1 was conducted during the period 2002-2003. ESS is a biennial
survey that covers more than 20 countries in Europe. The target population
of each country consists of all persons at the age of 15 or over who reside in the
country. The survey consists of core and rotating modules, and one of Round
1’s two rotating modules is dedicated to revealing individual opinions about
immigration-related issues by using almost 60 questions. This immigration
module was framed by giving each respondent the following introduction:
4However, migrants might increase the third factor by being input for the production
of that factor. In such a case, they would indirectly beneﬁte m p l o y e r s .
6“ P e o p l ec o m et ol i v ei n[ t h ec o u n t r yw h e r et h er e s p o n d e n tw a sq u e s t i o n e d ]
from other countries for diﬀerent reasons. Some have ancestral ties. Others
come to work here, or to join their families. Others come because they’re
under threat. Here are some questions about this issue.”5
We concentrate on the then member countries of the European Union.
By restricting the set of observations to these countries, and by focusing on
individual preferences with respect to the immigration from poorer countries
of Europe,6 we implicitly examine the determinants of individual attitudes
in the pre-enlargement European Union toward immigration from countries
that were about to join the Union on May 1, 2004.
3.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable indicates whether each respondent had a preference
for immigration restriction. We are interested in individual attitudes in the
pre-2004 enlargement European Union toward immigration from the coun-
tries that were about to join the Union. The variable is hence based on the
responses to the following question:7
• To what extent do you think [the country where the respondent was
questioned] should allow people from poorer countries in Europe to
come and live here?
5By the use of “live”, the permanency of immigrants’ stay is deliberately made ambigu-
ous. See Chapter 3 (Part 1) of the ESS Round 1 2002/2003 Technical Report (Edition 2,
June 2004) for the aim and outline of the immigration-related questions. We used Edition
6.0 of the data set that was released at http://ess.nsd.uib.no on 19 December 2006.
6See the following subsection about the dependent variable, anti.
7The ten countries that joined the Union in 2004 had both GDP and GNP per capita
lower than any EU15 country according to World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
The exception is Malta.
7Each respondent was asked to choose one of the following 4 ordered cate-
gories: “none”, “a few”, “some” and “many”. We collapse these to create a
binary variable, anti, that indicates a preference for immigration restriction,





1 if she/he chose either “none” or “a few”
0 otherwise.
3.2 Explanatory variables
The main explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if a respondent employed at least one person including her-/himself
and 0 otherwise.8 We call this variable employ. According to Section 2,
employers would be less likely to prefer immigration restriction if immigrants
were perceived to increase the supply of labor. They would be more likely
to prefer immigration restriction if immigrants were perceived to increase the
number of producers.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of respondents with employ =1and
those with employ =0 , respectively, over the 4 ordered categories on which
our dependent variable is based. It implies that employers were more, rather
than less, restrictive than the others, regarding immigration from poorer
8Question F13 of ESS asked “How many employees do or did you have?” to those
who chose “selfemployed” in Question F12. Although the respondents were supposed
to be ﬁltered by Question F12 in this way, we found some respondents who recorded a
positive number of employees in F13 but did not chose “selfemployed” in F12. Question
F12 asked each respondent to choose either “an employee”, “selfemployed” or “working
for your own family’s business” that best described her/his status in her/his main job.
If the respondent was not working at the time of the interview, the question was asked
about her/his previous job. We did not exclude those non-selfemployed employers. That
is, employ =1if a respondent either chose “selfemployed” in F12 or recorded a positive
integer in F13, or both.
8countries in Europe.
[Figure 1 about here]
ESS allows us to distinguish between employers by the number of em-
ployees. Figure 2 shows the distributions of respondents who employed only
themselves and those who did not employ themselves, respectively, over the
4 ordered categories on which our dependent variable is based. It suggests
that those who employed only themselves were even more likely to prefer im-
migration restriction than the rest, compared to Figure 1. However, Figure
3 indicates that there was not much diﬀerence between those who employed
at least one person other than themselves and the rest.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
These pictures motivate regression analysis to control factors aﬀecting
individual attitudes other than the status of being an employer. For ex-
ample, Table 1 shows that more of those with employ =1are distributed
to low levels of education, compared to the distribution for the whole sam-
ple. The same table also indicates that those who employed only themselves
are responsible for this observation. On the other hand, less of those who
employed at least one person other than themselves seem to be distributed
to low levels of education, compared to the distribution for the whole sam-
ple. Hence we create 4 dummy variables (ed0 to ed3) to control for each
9respondent’s level of education.9
[Table 1 about here]
We also ﬁnd that those who employed at least one person other than
themselves were richer than the others. ESS collected each respondent’s
estimate of net household income in 12 ordered categories. The categories
do not share an equal interval. We assign the mid-value of each category’s
income range to the respondents in that category.10 We then divide each
ﬁgure by the corresponding number of household members because we ex-
amine the importance of economic self-interest to individual attitudes. This
yields net income per capita assuming, although unrealistic, that household
income is shared equally by the members. We ﬁnally divide each ﬁgure by
the corresponding national mean net income per capita. We call this vari-
able relinc, approximating the relative income position of each respondent
in the country where she or he was interviewed.
T h es a m p l em e a no frelinc is 1.075. However, the mean for those with
employ =1is higher than the rest (1.243 and 1.050, respectively). The
9ESS sorted respondents into 7 groups according to a modiﬁed version of ISCED97, as
in Table 1. We collapse these into 4 groups by merging “primary or basic (ﬁrst stage)”
and “lower secondary or basic (second stage)”; “upper secondary” and “postsecondary
(non-tertiary)”; and “tertiary (ﬁrst stage)” and “tertiary (second stage)”. The data for
A u s t r i aa r em i s s i n gi nt h ec r o s s - c o u n t r yd a t aﬁle due to a slight inconsistency in the data
collection between the country and the rest. We used the corresponding data in the
Austria-speciﬁc ﬁle by merging “abschluss weiterbildende schule” and “matura”.
10The highest category has no upper bound and hence no mid-value. We used the
following formula for the mid-value of the highest category: the largest ﬁgure for the
second highest category + (the largest ﬁgure for the second highest category − the largest
ﬁgure for the third highest category)/2. The data for France and Ireland are missing in
the cross-country ﬁle due to a slight inconsistency in the data collection between these
countries and the rest. However, this should not matter, for our measure is of relative
income at the national level. Hence we used the corresponding household income data
from country-speciﬁc ﬁles for France and Ireland.
10diﬀerence stems from the gap between those who employed at least one person
other than themselves and the rest. While we ﬁnd little diﬀerence between
the means for those who employed only themselves and the others (1.050 and
1.077, respectively),11 the ﬁgure for those who employed at least one person
other than themselves is much higher than the ﬁgure for the rest (1.534 and
1.050, respectively).12
We speculate that immigrant labor is more employable in some sectors
than others due to the nature of production. If immigrant labor were more
employable, employers would beneﬁt from an increase in labor supply due to
immigration. In order to diﬀerentiate observations by the sectoral employ-
ability of immigrants, we create a measure that approximates the relative
extent of the sectoral employment of foreign workers in each country. By
using Eurostat Census 2001, we compute the share of foreigners in each sec-
tor’s total employment in a country, divided by the share of foreigners in that
country’s total employment. Table 2 presents the obtained ﬁgures.13 A ﬁg-
ure greater than 1 indicates that the share of foreigners in the corresponding
sector’s employment is relatively high in the country. We assume that this
indicates a relatively high employability of immigrant labor in the sector.14
Unfortunately, the corresponding Belgian data are missing in the source.
11The 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for these ﬁgures overlap each other.
12The ﬁgures are computed using the sample after listwise deletion, i.e., the observations
actually used for regression.
13OECD has produced a similar table in its annual publication, International Migration
Outlook (formerly Trends in International Migration), but it does not give the ﬁgures as
we do in our table.
14However, this assumption may not be valid in some countries. Even in a sector where
foreign workers are highly employable, we may observe a low value of isb because of, for
instance, strict national policy regarding the issuance of work permits. We discuss this
possibility further in the conclusion.
11[Table 2 about here]
Not surprisingly, in all 14 countries, the hotel and restaurant sector em-
ployed many foreign workers (category h). Another sector with a relatively
high proportion of foreigners is of household activities (category p), e.g.,
housemaids. In the other sectors, however, we see variations across the
countries. We also notice that the required skills in sectors with a high
proportion of foreign workers vary considerably. For instance, while the
construction sector (category f) hired many foreign workers in more than
half the countries, they also seem to have been highly present in the educa-
tion sector (category m) in Finland and the health and social service sector
(category n) in the United Kingdom.
ESS collected a two-digit NACE Rev.1 code for each respondent, and
hence we know to which NACE Rev.1 major group he or she belonged.15
We assign the relevant ﬁgure in Table 2 to each ESS respondent.16 We call
this variable isb. We removed observations that belonged to extraterrito-
rial organizations (category q). The sector should naturally employ many
foreigners, and Table 2 conﬁrms that in 5 countries. The exclusion of the ob-
servations should remove outliers, for the proportion of those who belonged
to such an organization in each country is very low: the highest is .013 in
France.
15Note that the coding was based on each respondent’s answer to ESS Question F24:
What does or did the ﬁrm or organization you work or worked for mainly do or make?
Since a respondent could give an answer based on the past work, the respondents without
a NACE Rev.1 code are not identical with the unemployed.
16This variable is similar to what Mayda (2006: Table 3A, Speciﬁcations 11 and 12)
constructed at the occupation level. We use sector rather than occupation because our
focus is on employers, not employees.
12T h es a m p l em e a no fisb is .988.W e ﬁnd that the ﬁgure is slightly
higher for employers than the others (1.057 for employ =1and .978 for the
rest). However, there is little diﬀerence between the means for those who
employed only themselves and the rest (1.024 and .985, respectively).17 We
ﬁnd that those who employed at least one person other than themselves were
on average in sectors with a high proportion of foreign workers (1.107 for
those who employed at least one person other than themselves and .982 for
the rest).
Other explanatory variables include purely exogenous variables such as a
respondent’s gender (female)a n da p p r o x i m a t eage in years at the time of
interview. We also have an indicator of whether or not at least one parent
of a respondent was born abroad (fparent); the respondent belonged to an
ethnic minority in the country where the interview took place (ethnic); and
he or she was a citizen of that country (citizen).
A respondent’s closeness to immigrants is approximated by the number
of immigrant friends she or he had (friend dummies). In addition, we use
a measure of a respondent’s exposure to the media on current aﬀairs and
politics (media) in hours per weekday.18 The media is often thought to in-
ﬂuence one’s view, and we want to control for such potential inﬂuence. Since
the status of being unemployed has been found an important determinant
17The 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for these ﬁgures overlap each other.
18We created this variable by using the responses to the 3 separate questions: On an
average weekday, how much of your time is spent watching television (ESS Question A2)
/ listening to the radio (A4) / reading newspapers (A6) about politics and current aﬀairs?
The responses to these questions were given on the same scale that has an equal interval
in hours between categories. This enables us to easily aggregate the responses at the
individual level.
13of individual attitudes toward immigration,19 we also control for it by using
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent was unemployed and
wanting a job in the last seven days and 0 otherwise.20 We call this variable
unemploy.
Finally, we control for race/ethnicity-based discrimination attitudes. To
do this, we use the responses to the following two questions:
• To what extent do you think [the country where the respondent was
questioned] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as
most of the people in the country to come and live here?
• To what extent do you think [the country where the respondent was
questioned] should allow people of a race or ethnic group diﬀerent from
most of the people in the country to come and live here?
These questions ask the same except the race or ethnic group of migrants.
Therefore, any diﬀerence between the responses within a respondent should
pick up his/her discrimination based on race or ethnicity. For each question,
a response is one of “none (coded as 0)”, “a few (1)”, “some (2)” or “many
(3)”. We subtract the response to the second question from that to the ﬁrst
question for each respondent. Hence the higher the number we obtain, the
more discriminating against diﬀerent races and ethnic groups.21 We call this
variable racist.
19See for example O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006).
20We included both those who indicated that they were actively looking for a job
(uempla =1i nE S SQ u e s t i o nF 8 a )a n dt h o s ew h oi n d icated that they were not actively
jobhunting but wanting a job (uempli =1in the same question). We are not primarily
interested in attitudes of the unemployed, but we include this variable to increase the
goodness of ﬁt.
21This way of taking the diﬀerence is inappropriate, for the response categories are only
ordered. In other words, the magnitude of an estimated coeﬃcient is not meaningful. Our
14Table 3 provides summary statistics for our variables. Due to a lack of
information on isb, we exclude Belgium from the EU15 countries in our main
data analysis.
[Table 3 about here]
4R e s u l t s
We estimate probit speciﬁcations by maximum likelihood. The benchmark
model is
Pr(anti =1 |employ,x)=Φ(α + βemploy + x
0γ) (8)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. We are interested in ˆ β’s contribu-
tion to the probability.
We present marginal eﬀects in terms of probability evaluated at the mean
of each explanatory variable. For a binary explanatory variable, the ﬁgure is
the probability diﬀerence between observations with the variable equal to 1
and those with the variable equal to 0. Estimated standard errors are based
on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within
each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.22
aim is to control for race/ethnicity-based attitudes of respondents and see the direction of
inﬂuence, e.g., Agresti (2002).
22Since the probit-estimated conditional mean function is inconsistent when there is
heteroskedasticity, reporting robust standard errors does not solve the problem of varia-
tion in the variance. One way to tackle this is to model the variance as a function of
covariates, e.g., Wooldridge (2002: 463-465). However, we do not report our results from
such probit models because the results changed dramatically by using diﬀerent sets of
covariates in modelling the variation in the variance. It was unclear ap r i o r iwhich set of
15Table 4 presents the benchmark result for the Union as well as each
member state except Belgium.23 The variable of our main interest is employ.
We ﬁnd that the status of being an employer is not statistically signiﬁcant
at the Union level. However, it is so for four countries. Employers were less
likely to prefer immigration restriction than the others only in Austria: the
probability of being restrictive is lower for employers than the rest by about
.2. For the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the estimated
probability diﬀerence is positive, although the size is small ranging from .065
in Sweden to .080 in the UK.
[Table 4 about here]
Turning to the other variables, the estimated marginal eﬀect of isb also
has diﬀerent signs across the countries. It is signiﬁcantly positive for Ger-
many, Greece and Luxembourg and is negative for Finland and the UK.
However, it is signiﬁcant not only statistically but also in size only for Lux-
embourg where an increase in the sectoral employability of foreign workers
by .1 is related to an increase in the probability of being restrictive approx-
imately by .02.T h e m a r g i n a l e ﬀect of isb is not statistically signiﬁcant at
the Union level.
The estimated eﬀect of unemploy suggests that the unemployed were in
general more likely to support immigration restriction than the rest: the
probability of being anti-immigration is higher for the unemployed than the
variables should be used in modelling the variation, for diﬀerent sets of variables passed
the signiﬁcance test.
23In the EU probit, we include 13 country dummies, although the corresponding esti-
mates are not reported in the following tables due to a lack of space.
16others by about .1 at the Union level, although this is true at the country
level only for Germany, Finland and Italy. This might suggest that the
unemployed were more worried about the labor market eﬀect of immigration
than the rest. This ﬁnding is consistent with O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006),
but Bauer et al. (2000) found that the status of being unemployed was not
an important determinant.
The exposure to the media on current aﬀairs and politics seems to re-
duce the probability of preferring immigration restriction: the sign of the
estimated marginal eﬀect of media is signiﬁcantly negative at the Union
level. At the country level, it is signiﬁcantly negative for Germany, Den-
mark, France and the UK. For instance, an additional hour spent on the
media is related to a decrease in the probability of being restrictive by about
.03 in France and the UK. The reason for the negative eﬀe c tm i g h tb eb e -
cause longer exposure to the media on current aﬀairs and politics increases
the chance of knowing various perspectives on the subject, resulting in less
biased opinions.
The relative income position does not seem to be an important deter-
minant of individual attitudes toward immigration: the estimated marginal
eﬀect of relinc is signiﬁcantly negative only for Portugal but at 10 percent.
We ﬁnd that more educated persons are less likely to prefer immigration
restriction except for Spain and Portugal where the eﬀect of education is not
statistically signiﬁcant. A higher level of education seems to make people
more liberal. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007).24
24Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2006) show that this implies native workers’
concern with the labor market impact of immigration, consistent with the H-O model.
17As we expected, the more immigrant friends the respondent had, the less
likely to be anti-immigration she or he was except in Luxembourg where
the eﬀects of friend dummies are not statistically signiﬁcant. Note that
the proportion of non-nationals is very high in Luxembourg compared to the
other countries: hence the number of immigrant friends may not pick up the
closeness to immigrants as good as it does in the other countries.
Discrimination against minority races increases the probability of prefer-
ring immigration restriction in most of the countries. The eﬀect of racist is
signiﬁcantly positive also at the Union level. This seems to extend Dustmann
and Preston’s (2004) ﬁnding about the UK to other EU countries.
Being a citizen of the country is associated with a higher probability of
preferring immigration restriction than otherwise in Germany, Spain, Fin-
land, Greece and Ireland. The eﬀect of citizen is signiﬁcantly positive also
at the Union level.
The estimated eﬀect of ethnic is mixed across the countries. Belonging
to an ethnic minority group in the country is associated with a lower proba-
bility of being anti-immigration than otherwise in Spain, Finland, Greece and
Luxembourg, but with a higher probability in Austria and Italy. The mag-
nitude of the eﬀect is large for Italy. The eﬀect of ethnic is not statistically
signiﬁcant at the Union level, however.
Having at least one parent who was born outside the country is associated
with a lower probability of being restrictive than otherwise in France, Greece
and the Netherlands. This is also the case at the Union level. Scheve and
Slaughter (2001) for instance found that immigrants and their children were
less restrictive than the rest in the US.
18Females were less likely to be anti-immigration than males in Germany,
Denmark, Finland, Greece and Ireland. However, the eﬀect of female is
not statistically signiﬁcant at the Union level.
The older the respondent was, the more likely to be restrictive he or she
was in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France and Greece. This is
also the case at the Union level. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings by other studies,
e.g., O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006).
[Table 5 about here]
Immigrant labor may be useful input for some, but not all, sectors in
a host economy. In Table 5, we interact employ with our measure of the
sectoral employability of immigrant labor. We expect the marginal eﬀect
of this interaction term to be negative. That is, we expect employers to
be less restrictive in sectors where the employability of foreign workers is
relatively high in the country. We also interact unemploy with isb to ex-
amine whether its marginal eﬀect is positive. That is, native workers are
more likely to compete with immigrants in sectors where the employability
of foreign workers is relatively high in the country. The addition of these
two interaction terms worsens the ﬁtness only for Ireland. For most of the
other countries, the three goodness-of-ﬁt measures increase. However, the
results are not necessarily consistent with our expectation.
We ﬁnd the marginal eﬀect of employ ×isb signiﬁcantly negative only in
Luxembourg. Its size relative to the signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of employ
implies that, as far as the sectoral employability of immigrant labor was as
19high as the national average, i.e., isb ≥ 1, employers were less likely to be
restrictive than the rest. In sectors where isb was low, employers were more
likely to be restrictive than the rest. One possible explanation for the latter
is that immigration can make them less competitive in the output market
than those employers who could beneﬁt from cheap labor. Therefore, this
Luxembourg case is consistent with our expectation.
In Spain and the UK, however, we ﬁnd the marginal eﬀect of employ×isb
signiﬁcantly positive. For Spain, its size relative to the signiﬁcantly nega-
tive eﬀect of employ implies that, as far as the employability of immigrant
labor does not exceed the national average, employers remain supportive of
immigration than the rest. This might suggest that isb i sn o tam e a s u r eo f
the sectoral employability of immigrants. A low value of isb m i g h tb ef o r
instance just a consequence of restrictive immigration policy in place at the
time. If so, a low value of isb in a sector might be a sign of labor shortage
in that sector, and the employers may desire increased immigration.
The eﬀect of employ is signiﬁcantly negative in Austria and positive in
Finland and Sweden. It does not seem to depend on isb in these countries.
Also note that neither employ nor employ×isb is an important determinant
at the Union level.
Turning to the status of being unemployed, the estimated marginal eﬀect
of unemploy×isb is signiﬁcantly positive in Italy and Luxembourg. In both
countries, the eﬀect of unemploy is signiﬁcantly negative. Therefore, the
status of being unemployed increases the probability of preferring immigra-
tion restriction if the sectoral employability of immigrant labor is suﬃciently
high: isb ≥ .6 for Italy and isb ≥ .4 for Luxembourg.
20The marginal eﬀect of unemploy×isb is signiﬁcantly negative in Germany,
Spain and the UK. For the former two countries, the eﬀect of unemploy is
signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that the unemployed were more restrictive
than the rest in sectors where the share of foreign workers in employment is
relatively low. This might be due to the fear of being invaded rather than
already realized penetration by immigrant workers.
At the Union level, the eﬀect of unemploy is signiﬁcantly positive as in
Table 4, but the magnitude is larger. The marginal eﬀect of unemploy×isb
is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results for the other explanatory variables remain almost the same
as in Table 4.
[Tables 6(a) and 6(b) about here]
The results in Tables 4 and 5 conﬁrmed our expectation about the eﬀect
of employ only in a few countries, while we found counter evidence in a few
other countries. At the Union level, the status of being an employer does
not seem to matter to individual preferences for immigration restriction.
T h i sc o u l db ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a te m p l o y e r sh a dd i ﬀerent opinions about
t h ee c o n o m i ci m p a c to fi m m i g r a t i o n ,w h i l et h ea s s u m p t i o nf o rd e r i v i n gt h e
hypotheses is that employers anticipate immigration to reduce the cost of
labor by increasing labor supply.
In order to control for the perception of the economic impact of im-
migration, we split the sample into two such that, within each subsample,
21respondents shared a similar opinion about immigration’s impact on the cost
of labor. ESS Round 1 contains responses to the following statement:25
• Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people com-
ing to live and work here.
One group consists of respondents who chose either “agree” or “strongly
agree” with the statement, and the other group consists of the remaining
non-missing respondents. By controlling for this subjective perception, we
ﬁnd that the results change. In Table 6(a), we presents the results by
re-estimating the speciﬁcation of Table 4 only for those who thought that
immigration would have a negative eﬀect on wages. Table 6(b) presents the
results for those who did not think so.
In Table 6(a), we ﬁnd the eﬀect of employ statistically insigniﬁcant except
for Austria where it is negative. The magnitude is similar to the one we
found in Table 4. The other estimates suggest that the status of being an
employer did not make a diﬀerence to individual preferences for immigration
restriction in most of the countries even in a group of people who expected
immigration to reduce the cost of labor. (In addition, we ﬁnd later in Table
6 ( b )t h a t ,i nA u s t r i a ,t h ee ﬀect of employ is signiﬁcantly negative also among
those who did not expect immigration to reduce wages, suggesting that the
negative eﬀect of employ in the country does not support our theoretical
reasoning.)
Turning to the other variables, there is now only one country for which
the eﬀect of unemploy remains signiﬁcantly positive, i.e., Italy. However,
25Question D18
22the eﬀect of unemploy remains signiﬁcantly positive at the Union level. The
marginal eﬀect of isb is still signiﬁcantly positive for Greece and Luxembourg,
but no longer signiﬁcant for Germany. Instead it is signiﬁcantly positive for
Austria. It is now signiﬁcantly negative for Ireland, but no longer signiﬁcant
for Finland and the UK. The result is thus mixed. The marginal eﬀect of
relinc is signiﬁcantly positive for Portugal and Sweden. Note that it was
negative only for Portugal in Table 4.
As for the eﬀect of education, we still ﬁnd that a higher attainment is
related to a lower probability of being anti-immigration. However, we also
note that educational attainment is not important for more countries than
in Table 4, namely, Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden.
We ﬁnd that the exposure to the media is not an important determinant at
all in this subsample, while its marginal eﬀect was signiﬁcantly negative at
the Union level as well as for some countries in Table 4. The eﬀect of having
immigrant friends continues to be generally negative, and the magnitude
is increasing in the number of such friends. But we also note that it is
not signiﬁcant for more countries than in Table 4, i.e., Greece, Luxembourg,
Sweden and the UK. Surprisingly, the eﬀect of racist is signiﬁcantly negative
for Spain (i.e., the more racist a respondent was, the less restrictive he or she
was in Spain), although it remains generally positive for others.
The eﬀect of citizen is no longer signiﬁcant at the Union level. Neither
for Ireland. It becomes signiﬁcantly positive for Luxembourg, while it is not
only signiﬁcant but also negative for Denmark. The eﬀect of belonging to
an ethnic minority group in the country now seems negative, while it was
m i x e ds i g n w i s ei nT a b l e4 . T h ee ﬀe c to fh a v i n ga tl e a s to n ep a r e n tb o r n
23overseas continues to be signiﬁcantly negative at the Union level. However,
we now ﬁnd that it is positive for Austria and Spain. The eﬀect of female
is now signiﬁcantly positive for France and Italy, while it was negative for
countries where it was statistically signiﬁcant in Table 4. This may be
intuitive: females are generally disadvantaged in the labor market, so the
eﬀect of female is positive among those who anticipate a negative labor
market impact of immigration. The marginal eﬀect of age remains generally
positive, although it is now negative for Ireland and the Netherlands.
Table 6(b) reports the results for the subsample of those who did not
think that immigration would depress wages. The results are somewhat
diﬀerent from Table 6(a). The eﬀect of employ c o n t i n u e st ob es i g n i ﬁcantly
negative for Austria. We observe that the magnitude is larger than that for
those who thought that wages would fall due to immigration. This seems
to suggest that the source of beneﬁt from immigration is not its wage eﬀect
in the country, and it does not support our theoretical reasoning. The
eﬀect of employ is signiﬁcantly positive for Spain, Sweden and the UK. It
is also signiﬁcantly positive at the Union level. Since we did not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of employ in Table 6(a), the positive eﬀect of
employ comes from those employers who did not think that immigration
would reduce wages. This seems to suggest that there is not beneﬁtb u ts o m e
disadvantage of immigration for employers, e.g., they increase the number of
producers.
The eﬀect of unemploy is no longer signiﬁcant except for the Netherlands
where it is signiﬁcantly negative but only at 10 percent. This, together with
the estimate in Table 6(a), appears consistent with what we would expect:
24the unemployed would be against immigration if they anticipate immigration
to aﬀect their labor market negatively, further reducing the employment
prospect. The marginal eﬀect of isb is signiﬁcantly positive for Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. But it is negative for Finland. Note
that the marginal eﬀect of isb was signiﬁcantly positive for Luxembourg also
among those who expected immigration to reduce wages: see Table 6(a).
The marginal eﬀect of media is generally negative except for Italy where it
is signiﬁcantly positive. The media seems to have a pro-immigration eﬀect
among those who did not anticipate a wage fall due to immigration, while it
was found insigniﬁcant among those who expected immigration to induce a
wage reduction.
The marginal eﬀect of relinc is not statistically signiﬁcant except for
Greece where it is negative at 10 percent. A higher educational attainment
continues to be associated with a lower probability of being anti-immigration,
although the educational attainment dummies are not statistically signiﬁcant
for Austria, Spain and Luxembourg. Since the education dummies were
insigniﬁcant for these countries also in Table 6(a), we might conclude that
education is not an important determinant of individual attitudes toward
immigration in these countries once we control for the subjective perception
of the impact of immigration on wages.
The eﬀect of having immigrant friends remains generally negative, and
the magnitude is increasing in the number of such friends, except for Italy
and Luxembourg where it is statistically insigniﬁcant. Note that, for Luxem-
bourg, the eﬀect of having immigrant friends was insigniﬁcant also in Table
6(a). The eﬀect of racist is positive. So is the eﬀect of citizen: in particular
25for Greece and Ireland. The eﬀect of belonging to an ethinc minority group
does not seem to matter to individual preferences for immigration restriction
except for Austria and Italy where it is signiﬁcantly positive. Since the eﬀect
of ethnic was generally negative in Table 6(a), the mixed results we found
in Table 4 are thus split signwise by the perception. However, it is counter
intuitive. We would expect the eﬀect of ethnic to be positive, rather than
negative, among those who anticipate a wage fall due to immigration because
immigrants would easily substitute for ethnic minority workers.
The eﬀe c to fh a v i n ga tl e a s to n ep a r e n tb o r na b r o a di sm i x e d :i ti ss i g -
niﬁcantly negative for Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but positive for
Finland and Sweden. The eﬀect of female is negative where it is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, i.e., Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Sweden. The
marginal eﬀect of age is positive where it is statistically signiﬁcant, namely,
Austria, Denmark, Finland and France. It is also signiﬁcantly positive at
the Union level.
[Tables 7(a) and 7(b) about here]
We also re-estimate the speciﬁcation used for Table 5. Table 7(a) reports
t h er e s u l t sf o rt h o s ew h ot h o u g h tt h a ti m m i g r a t i o nw o u l dd e p r e s sw a g e s ,a n d
Table 7(b) for those who did not think so.
Table 7(a) shows that the marginal eﬀect of employ × isb is signiﬁcantly
negative for Luxembourg and Portugal. This is consistent with our expecta-
tion that employers are more pro-immigration in sectors where migrant labor
is useful input. However, for Austria where the eﬀect of employ is signiﬁ-
cantly negative, it is positive. It suggests that employers are more likely to
26be pro-immigration in the country unless the sectoral employability of immi-
grant labor is suﬃciently high. Note that the marginal eﬀect of employ×isb
was found statistically insigniﬁcant for the country in Table 5. We ﬁnd that
neither the eﬀect of employ nor that of employ×isb is statistically signiﬁcant
at the Union level.
The marginal eﬀect of unemploy × isb is signiﬁcantly positive only for
Italy where the eﬀect of unemploy is signiﬁcantly negative. It suggests that
the unemployed were more likely to be restrictive than the rest in sectors
with a relatively high proportion of foreign workers. For Spain and France,
however, the marginal eﬀect of unemploy ×isb is signiﬁcantly negative, and
the eﬀect of unemploy is positive, suggesting that, as far as isb was suﬃ-
ciently low, the unemployed were more likely to be anti-immigration than
the others. This again implies that isb may not be a good measure of the
sectoral employability of immigrant workers in some countries. At the Union
level, we ﬁnd that the unemployed are more likely to be restrictive than the
rest regardless of isb,a sw ef o u n di nT a b l e5 . N o t ea l s ot h a tt h eI t a l i a na n d
Spanish results were the same in sign as in Table 5.
The eﬀects of the other explanatory variables remain almost the same as
in Table 6(a).
Table 7(b) shows that the marginal eﬀect of employ ×isb is signiﬁcantly
negative for Finland where the eﬀect of employ is signiﬁcantly positive. Here
the respondents did not think that immigration would depress wages. Hence
the source of the negative sign is not due to the wage impact of immigration.
Note that the marginal eﬀect of employ×isb is signiﬁcantly positive for Spain.
We also ﬁnd the eﬀect of employ signiﬁcantly positive for the Netherlands
27a n dS w e d e nr e g a r d l e s so fisb.
The marginal eﬀect of unemploy ×isb is signiﬁcantly positive for Greece
where the eﬀect of unemploy is negative. It suggests that the unemployed
were more likely to be anti-immigration in sectors where the presence of
foreign workers is relatively high in the country. However, for Germany,
Spain and the UK, the opposite is the case: as far as isb is suﬃciently low,
the unemployed are more likely to be restrictive than the others.
The estimated eﬀects of the other explanatory variables remain almost
t h es a m ea si nT a b l e6 ( b ) .
[Table 8 about here]
We have assumed that a high value of isb is associated with a high sectoral
employability of immigrant labor. However, even in sectors where foreign
workers are useful input for production, the presence of foreign workers might
be limited because of for instance restrictive policy regarding the issuance of
work permits.26 In such a case, a lower value of isb might be associated with
less restrictive attitudes, while a high value of isb might suggest an already
suﬃcient supply of immigrant labor. This might be one reason why the sign
of the employer-related terms interacted with isb is not consistent across the
countries.
In order to check whether the status of being an employer makes a dif-
ference in each sector assuming that the employability of foreign workers is
26Although the EU imposes restrictions on its members regarding the admission of
workers from non-member countries, the control of immigration from outside the Union
largely remains under the domain of national policies. See Boeri et al. (2002: 46).
28homogeneous within a sector across the countries, we re-estimate the speciﬁ-
cation of Table 4 without isb sector by sector. Due to the limited number of
observations, we did not re-estimate for each country but only at the Union
level. Note that, by dropping isb from the list of explanatory variables,
Belgian observations become useful. Hence we include Belgium in this es-
timation. Due to a lack of observations after listwise deletion, we ignore
ﬁshing activities (category b) and mining/quarrying activities (category c).
Table 8 compares the estimated eﬀects of employ and also unemploy across
the NACE Rev.1 major sectors.27 The ﬁgures in column i are from the full
sample, while those in columns ii and iii are from those who thought that
immigration would reduce wages and those who did not think so, respectively.
First, we notice that, using the full sample, employers are not particu-
l a r l ym o r es u p p o r t i v eo fi m m i g r a t i o nt h a nt h er e s ti nn o n eo ft h es e c t o r s .
However, in the household-activity sector (category p), the estimated eﬀect
of employ is 10%-signiﬁcantly positive, implying that employers were more
anti-immigration than the rest in that sector. By controlling for the subjec-
tive perception of the wage eﬀect of immigration, we ﬁnd that the statistical
signiﬁcance of the positive eﬀect increases for the sector among both those
who expected immigration to decrease wages and those who did not. In
addition, the magnitude is larger among those who did not think that im-
migration would depress wages than those who thought so. What makes
employers in the household-activity sector more anti-immigration than non-
employers? In the sample, we ﬁnd that all employers in this sector employed
27Due to a lack of space, the full results are not presented. The other estimates are
available from the author upon request.
29only themselves. Also note that foreign workers were highly present in the
sector across countries: see Table 2. If immigrants into this sector also self-
employed themselves, the number of service providers would increase in the
sector, intensifying competition in the output, rather than input, market.
We will check on this line of reasoning later.
Second, we ﬁnd that, in the hospitality sector (category h), the proba-
bility of preferring immigration restriction is higher for employers than the
others among those who anticipated immigration to reduce the cost of labor.
This is counter intuitive, given the standard argument exempliﬁed by Lord
Layard’s letter to the FT in the introduction. Note that the estimated eﬀect
of employ is also signiﬁcantly positive in the construction, wholesale/retail
and repairing service sectors (categories f and g) among those who did not
think that immigration would depress wages. Categories f, g, h and p gen-
erally employed more foreign workers than in the other categories, as Table
2 shows. It might be that employers had experienced dissatisfaction with
the quality of migrant labor they employed. Another possibility is that em-
ployers anticipated intensiﬁed competition in their output, rather than input,
markets due to immigration.
Third, there is only one sectoral category that gives evidence consistent
with our expectation, i.e., category o that includes sewage and refuse disposal,
sanitation-related activities and recreational, cultural and sports activities.
The estimated eﬀect of employ is signiﬁcantly negative among those who
thought that immigration would reduce wages.
When discussing the positive eﬀect of employ in the household-activity
sector above, we speculated that the size of an employer in terms of the
30number of employees might aﬀect the impact of immigration which the em-
ployer anticipates. Small employers, in particular those who employed only
themselves, might not gain from intensiﬁed competition in the labor mar-
ket. Since large employers may gain from it, small employers may even
lose because of intensiﬁed competition in the output market. In addition,
migrants might directly increase the number of producers in some sectors:
OECD (2006: 56-58) shows that self-employment among immigrants in those
countries has increased since 1999.28 Those migrants’ small businesses are
typically restaurants, cleaning services, groceries and the like (Jandl et al.
2003: 37-40).29
Since ESS allows us to distinguish between employers by the number of
employees, we re-estimated all the speciﬁcations presented above by replac-
ing employ with two variables. In one case, we used a dummy variable,
employself which is equal to 1 if a respondent employed only him-/herself
and 0 otherwise, together with a variable that records the number of em-
ployees excluding him-/herself. In the other case, we used employself and
employother which is equal to 1 if the number of employees excluding him-
/herself is at least one and 0 otherwise. These variables are also summarized
in Table 3.
Using these variables instead of employ, we found mixed results across
countries as well as across sectors at the Union level. We did not ﬁnd
28See Clark and Drinkwater (1998; 2000) and Blanchﬂower and Shadforth (2007) for
t h et r e n di nt h eU K .
29Menz (2002) describes how companies in high-wage countries took advantage of cheap
posted labor of subcontractors in low-wage countries within the Union. This also implies
that small self-employed subcontractors would have been competing with foreign labor,
while large employers beneﬁted from access to foreign labor.
31strong evidence that smaller employers, in particular those who employed
only themselves, were more likely to prefer immigration restriction. In Aus-
tria, employers were more pro-immigration than the rest regardless of the
number of employees. In Portugal, a bigger employer was more, rather than
less, likely to prefer immigration restriction. However, we did not ﬁnd any
pattern across sectors at the Union level.30
5C o n c l u s i o n
We examined the importance of being an employer in determining individual
preferences for immigration restriction in the EU countries during the period
2002-2003. A simple economic model implies that the immigration of workers
would beneﬁte m p l o y e r si nt h eh o s tc o u n t r y . H o w e v e r ,t h es a m em o d e l
also indicates that employers may oppose immigration when it increases the
number of producers. This latter possibility is often ignored in the literature
on individual attitudes toward immigration.
Our results from empirical analysis do not conﬁrm that employers were
more pro-immigration than the rest because immigration would reduce the
cost of labor. Exceptions are sanitation-related activities such as sewage and
refuse disposal and recreational, cultural and sports activities. In these sec-
tors, we ﬁnd that employers were less likely to prefer immigration restriction
than the rest among those who anticipated a wage fall due to immigration.
Employers were more pro-immigration than the rest in Austria, but we do
not conﬁrm that this is due to the wage eﬀect of immigration.
30The results are not included in the paper but available upon request.
32We also ﬁnd that, contrary to the common expectation, employers were
more, rather than less, likely to be anti-immigration than the rest in sec-
tors where foreign workers were highly present, such as household activities,
construction, wholesale, hotels and restaurants. We speculate that small em-
ployers were responsible for the higher probability of being restrictive among
employers than the others in these sectors. Employers are less likely to ben-
eﬁt from access to cheap labor if they are not hiring many workers. But
since large employers can beneﬁt from it, small employers would become less
competitive in the output market. Thus, immigration might hurt small em-
ployers indirectly by making large employers more competitive. However,
by using ESS Round 1, we did not ﬁnd any pattern that depends on the size
of employer in terms of the number of employees.
O n em a j o rw e a k n e s so ft h ea n a l y s i si st h a tw ed i dn o th a v ear e l i a b l e
measure of the employability of immigrant labor at the sector level in each
country. We suspect the main reason why we did not obtain any clear
pattern regarding employer × isb across the countries is that isb measures
the employability of immigrant labor in some sectors/countries but not in
others because immigration policy of each country would distort the ﬂow of
foreign labor. Further investigation is necessary with a better measure of
the sectoral employability of migrant workers.
In conclusion, it is inappropriate to assume without careful analysis that
employers are pro-immigration because of potential beneﬁts which economic
theory predicts them to receive. An investigation of the reasons why some
employers are more anti-immigration than the others is left for future re-
search.
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none a few some many
employ = 1 employ = 0
Source: ESS 2002-2003, Round 1, Questions D7, F12 and F13
Fig.1  To what extent do you think the country should allow












none a few some many
employ only him-/herself do not employ him-/herself
Source: ESS 2002-2003, Round  1, Questions D7, F12 and F13
Fig.2  To what extent do you think the  country should allow












none a few some many
have at least one employee other than him-/herself don't
Source: ESS 2002-2003, Round 1, Questions D7 and F13
Fig.3  To what extent do you think the country should allow
people from poorer countries in Europe to come and live?Table 1
Relative frequencies across attained educational levels




Not completed primary education 4.66 6.90 9.69 2.61
Primary or first stage of basic 15.54 21.65 24.69 16.98
Lower secondary or secondary stage of basic 24.06 20.62 20.31 21.10
Upper secondary 29.95 25.71 22.23 31.07
Post secondary, non-tertiary 6.90 6.47 5.58 7.84
First stage of tertiary 15.12 14.99 14.06 16.43
Second stage of tertiary 3.77 3.65 3.44 3.99
Sample size 28951 3695 2240 1455
Source : ESS 2002-2003, Round 1, http://ess.nsd.uib.no, Questions F6, F12, F13
NB: The figures in each column may not add up to 100 due to rounding.Table 2
Extent of the sectoral employment of foreigners by country (isb)
Sector (NACE Rev.1 major division of economic activities)
Country abcdefghijklmnopq
Austria (AT) 0.42 .. 0.82 1.21 0.25 1.53 0.91 2.23 0.89 0.39 1.36 0.07 0.43 0.70 1.09 1.62 3.14
Germany (DE) 0.45 .. .. 1.35 .. 1.07 0.90 3.32 1.00 0.40 1.10 0.23 0.47 0.67 0.97 1.30 ..
Denmark (DK) 1.00 0.49 0.65 1.12 0.23 0.46 0.86 3.27 0.97 0.34 1.66 0.27 0.98 0.74 0.91 1.00 12.86
Spain (ES) 1.88 0.64 0.78 0.66 0.45 1.46 0.71 2.06 0.66 0.35 0.87 0.19 0.50 0.52 0.87 5.61 ..
Finland (FI) 0.35 0.42 0.19 0.93 0.19 0.72 0.97 2.90 0.82 0.36 1.62 0.33 1.57 0.57 1.08 .. 11.58
France (FR) 0.80 .. 1.14 1.02 0.25 2.51 0.90 1.90 0.64 0.40 1.46 0.27 0.49 0.57 1.05 4.32 9.57
Greece (GR) 1.21 1.12 0.59 1.03 0.16 2.86 0.53 1.35 0.41 0.14 0.64 0.11 0.24 0.30 0.56 7.94 ..
Ireland (IE) 0.43 1.05 0.61 0.94 0.37 0.68 0.77 2.14 0.76 0.78 1.35 0.28 0.68 1.08 0.97 2.16 ..
Italy (IT) 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.31 0.34 1.50 0.67 1.66 0.73 0.23 0.54 0.16 0.43 0.58 1.01 .. ..
Luxembourg (LU) 0.44 0.00 1.23 0.88 0.13 1.72 0.98 1.74 0.62 1.10 1.37 0.12 0.34 0.72 0.90 1.94 1.99
Netherlands (NL) 0.85 0.25 1.97 1.22 0.29 0.51 0.89 2.20 0.83 0.57 1.87 0.24 0.70 0.48 0.90 .. ..
Portugal (PT) 0.44 0.43 0.89 0.60 0.65 2.65 0.68 1.80 0.58 0.31 1.38 0.29 0.49 0.81 1.46 1.84 ..
Sweden (SE) 0.40 0.21 0.51 1.18 0.29 0.57 0.82 2.68 0.88 0.55 1.28 0.38 0.95 0.96 0.91 4.02 ..
UK (UK) 0.34 0.40 0.75 0.78 0.57 0.56 0.88 1.82 1.06 1.12 1.23 0.76 1.00 1.23 0.97 2.54 ..
Source: Eurostat Census 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat
Each figure is defined, for the corresponding country, as
((# foreigners employed in the sector)/(# all employed in the sector))/((# foreigners employed in all sectors)/(# all employed in all sectors)).
a = agriculture, hunting, forestry
b = fishing
c = mining, quarrying
d = manufacturing
e = electricity, gas, water supply
f = construction
g = wholesale/retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods
h = hotels, restaurants
i = transport, storage, communication
j = financial intermediation
k = real estate/renting/business activities
l = public administration, defence, compulsory social security
m = education
n = health/social work
o = other community/social/personal service activities
p = household activities
q = extraterritorial organizations/bodies
Further details about the categories are in
Eurostat (1996) NACE Rev.1: Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community.Table 3
Summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean s.d. Median Min. Max. Obs. ESS Q. No.
anti Permissible number of immigrants from poorer European countries 0.472 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 26013 D7
1 = "none" or "a few"; 0 = "some" or "many"
employ  † 1 = employ at least one person including oneself; 0 = otherwise 0.128 0.334 0.000 0.000 1.000 27211 F12, F13
employself  † 1 = employ only oneself; 0 = otherwise 0.077 0.268 0.000 0.000 1.000 27211 F12, F13
employees  † Number of employees other than oneself 0.624 20.341 0.000 0.000 3010.000 27211 F13
employother  † 1 = employ other than oneself; 0 = otherwise 0.050 0.219 0.000 0.000 1.000 27211 F13
unemploy  † 1 = unemployed and wanting a job; 0 = otherwise 0.049 0.216 0.000 0.000 1.000 27211 F8a
isb Extent of the sectoral employment of foreigners 0.991 0.664 0.907 0.000 7.940 23391 F24
relinc Intra-country relative net income per capita 1.047 0.941 0.806 0.007 19.485 21138 F1, F30
ed0 1 = less than primary education; 0 = otherwise 0.048 0.215 0.000 0.000 1.000 27082 F6
ed1 1 = primary, basic or lower secondary; 0 = otherwise 0.400 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 27082 F6
ed2 1 = upper secondary or non-tertiary postsecondary; 0 = otherwise 0.368 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 27082 F6
ed3 1 = tertiary; 0 = otherwise 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 1.000 27082 F6
friend 0 1 = no immigrant friend; 0 = otherwise 0.520 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 27052 D47
friend 1 1 = a few immigrant friends; 0 = otherwise 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 27052 D47
friend 2 1 = several immigrant friends; 0 = otherwise 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000 27052 D47
media Hours spent on the media on current affairs per weekday 1.597 1.281 1.250 0.000 9.750 27069 A2, A4, A6
racist Discrimination against races different from the majority 0.222 0.567 0.000 -3.000 3.000 25723 D4,D5
citizen 1 = citizen of the country; 0 = non-citizen 0.954 0.209 1.000 0.000 1.000 27192 C18
ethnic 1 = belong to an ethnic minority in the country; 0 = do not 0.035 0.184 0.000 0.000 1.000 26726 C24
fparent 1 = at least one parent was born abroad; 0 = otherwise 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 1.000 27173 C25, C27
age Approximate age in years at the time of interview 47.130 18.276 46.000 14.000 110.000 27050 F3, inwyr
female  † 1 = female; 0 = otherwise 0.534 0.498 1.000 0.000 1.000 27211 F2
Sources : ESS 2002-2003, Round 1; Eurostat Census 2001
NB: Unweighted
† Code 0 includes missing observations.Table 4
Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ 0.017 -0.197 *** -0.037 -0.009 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.044 0.057 -0.012 0.070 * 0.016 0.065 ** 0.080 *
0.019 0.046 0.042 0.057 0.055 0.046 0.082 0.030 0.033 0.052 0.080 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.045
unemploy 0.081 *** -0.010 0.108 ** 0.026 0.064 0.095 ** 0.066 -0.001 0.011 0.135 * -0.133 -0.105 -0.092 0.021 0.022
0.023 0.091 0.043 0.083 0.044 0.041 0.061 0.042 0.027 0.085 0.162 0.091 0.112 0.051 0.100
isb 0.000 0.066 0.038 ** -0.018 -0.008 -0.060 *** 0.016 0.014 ** -0.025 -0.071 0.210 *** 0.024 -0.016 -0.014 -0.093 **
0.011 0.051 0.017 0.045 0.023 0.008 0.028 0.006 0.020 0.075 0.057 0.024 0.039 0.013 0.044
relinc -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.016 -0.006 -0.009 -0.029 0.013 -0.008 -0.017 * -0.002 -0.002
0.006 0.014 0.014 0.032 0.029 0.011 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.036 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.011
ed0 0.129 *** 0.171 † s(1) 0.106 0.039 0.094 0.001 0.219 *** 0.354 ** 0.169 -0.037 0.152 f(10) f(1)
0.037 0.092 0.087 0.140 0.062 0.052 0.084 0.161 0.183 0.135 0.096
ed1 0.098 *** 0.031 0.113 *** 0.136 *** 0.030 0.007 0.103 ** 0.032 0.064 * 0.175 *** 0.093 * 0.063 * -0.018 0.059 *** 0.119 ***
0.015 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.057 0.017 0.044 0.020 0.034 0.053 0.053 0.033 0.041 0.019 0.025
ed3 -0.124 *** -0.084 ** -0.111 *** -0.163 *** 0.038 -0.114 *** -0.113 *** -0.147 *** -0.107 *** -0.027 -0.102 -0.169 *** -0.050 -0.064 *** -0.218 ***
0.015 0.038 0.019 0.036 0.075 0.034 0.026 0.032 0.032 0.124 0.066 0.027 0.049 0.015 0.031
media -0.017 *** 0.004 -0.025 * -0.024 * 0.033 0.006 -0.031 ** -0.017 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.007 -0.013 -0.002 -0.037 ***
0.006 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.023 0.006 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.029 0.015 0.011 0.032 0.002 0.009
friend1 -0.119 *** -0.144 *** -0.130 *** -0.110 *** -0.179 *** -0.127 *** -0.123 *** -0.078 *** -0.019 -0.157 *** -0.006 -0.076 *** -0.143 ** -0.002 -0.076 ***
0.011 0.035 0.018 0.023 0.041 0.013 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.050 0.063 0.026 0.065 0.024 0.027
friend2 -0.199 *** -0.319 *** -0.171 *** -0.270 *** -0.314 *** -0.299 *** -0.228 *** -0.152 *** -0.130 *** -0.256 ** 0.002 -0.086 ** -0.317 *** -0.032 * -0.102 ***
0.018 0.035 0.037 0.058 0.051 0.041 0.038 0.052 0.021 0.057 0.064 0.036 0.047 0.019 0.033
racist 0.129 *** -0.002 0.122 *** 0.119 *** 0.021 0.029 ** 0.120 *** 0.017 0.101 *** 0.111 * -0.005 0.173 *** 0.116 *** 0.107 *** 0.209 ***
0.012 0.042 0.022 0.018 0.035 0.013 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.054 0.038 0.030 0.029 0.012 0.032
citizen 0.073 ** -0.047 0.129 *** -0.018 0.319 ** 0.140 * -0.090 0.215 *** 0.149 *** f(1) 0.051 -0.033 0.074 -0.001 0.119
0.033 0.115 0.023 0.124 0.103 0.081 0.102 0.078 0.039 0.069 0.102 0.232 0.034 0.128
ethnic 0.018 0.095 * -0.087 0.080 -0.218 ** -0.261 ** 0.082 -0.087 *** -0.101 0.514 * -0.169 * 0.060 0.014 0.016 0.063
0.033 0.049 0.053 0.111 0.082 0.111 0.090 0.027 0.058 0.212 0.092 0.068 0.096 0.072 0.077
fparent -0.051 ** 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.009 0.077 -0.130 *** -0.080 ** 0.095 -0.095 -0.098 -0.080 * -0.103 0.031 -0.066
0.022 0.024 0.039 0.056 0.081 0.056 0.045 0.035 0.075 0.101 0.060 0.045 0.119 0.038 0.045
female -0.008 -0.003 -0.056 ** -0.064 * 0.035 -0.094 *** 0.036 -0.050 ** -0.040 * 0.029 0.020 -0.047 0.067 -0.020 0.017
0.013 0.032 0.023 0.034 0.036 0.026 0.042 0.025 0.022 0.046 0.046 0.030 0.045 0.015 0.019
age 0.001 *** 0.005 *** 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 0.000 0.007 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
log pseudolikelihood -10621.331 -678.319 -1189.042 -751.780 -477.409 -1012.549 -661.650 -537.589 -819.938 -272.724 -408.045 -1154.942 -509.107 -595.321 -995.562
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.110 0.103 0.078 0.083 0.061 0.116 0.118 0.127 0.052 0.091 0.050 0.054 0.089 0.087 0.132
R²p 0.280 0.190 0.088 0.194 0.225 0.274 0.200 0.054 0.025 0.090 0.149 0.068 0.077 0.009 0.271
Sum of PCP 1.341 1.284 1.171 1.260 1.255 1.327 1.294 1.150 1.063 1.167 1.155 1.136 1.166 1.028 1.315
obs. 17640.000 1123.000 1979.000 1197.000 734.000 1663.000 1112.000 1280.000 1419.000 480.000 620.000 1820.000 837.000 1697.000 1666.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 5
Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ -0.020 -0.302 ** 0.006 0.113 -0.153 ** 0.115 ** 0.012 -0.013 0.013 0.001 0.321 ** 0.163 0.037 0.131 * -0.112
0.033 0.119 0.061 0.115 0.063 0.055 0.094 0.032 0.077 0.139 0.126 0.100 0.055 0.089 0.110
employ x isb 0.035 0.105 -0.045 -0.118 0.133 ** -0.116 0.000 0.018 0.034 0.064 -0.350 ** -0.083 -0.021 -0.048 0.194 *
0.030 0.099 0.048 0.102 0.051 0.078 0.035 0.026 0.083 0.166 0.157 0.081 0.028 0.040 0.111
unemploy 0.137 *** -0.210 0.294 *** -0.044 0.200 ** 0.033 0.100 -0.108 -0.024 -0.239 * -0.513 ** -0.146 -0.015 -0.048 0.381
0.047 0.265 0.061 0.151 0.084 0.105 0.124 0.119 0.187 0.089 0.026 0.140 0.311 0.073 0.206
unemploy x isb -0.047 0.182 -0.141 *** 0.068 -0.121 ** 0.062 -0.029 0.078 0.034 0.444 *** 1.349 * 0.039 -0.075 0.074 -0.426 *
0.031 0.246 0.041 0.115 0.052 0.078 0.063 0.062 0.179 0.130 0.697 0.146 0.205 0.084 0.251
isb 0.000 0.048 0.066 *** -0.010 -0.016 -0.052 *** 0.018 0.005 -0.034 -0.111 0.231 *** 0.030 -0.010 -0.012 -0.106 **
0.012 0.056 0.016 0.050 0.025 0.009 0.025 0.006 0.026 0.095 0.061 0.025 0.042 0.013 0.043
relinc -0.009 -0.013 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 -0.006 -0.010 -0.029 0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002
0.006 0.014 0.014 0.032 0.029 0.011 0.019 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.036 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.012
ed0 0.128 *** 0.181 * † s(1) 0.100 0.040 0.094 0.005 0.220 *** 0.372 ** 0.174 -0.036 0.152 f(10) f(1)
0.037 0.090 0.084 0.139 0.062 0.049 0.086 0.161 0.180 0.136 0.097
ed1 0.098 *** 0.033 0.114 *** 0.136 *** 0.028 0.005 0.104 ** 0.035 * 0.066 ** 0.171 *** 0.100 * 0.061 * -0.017 0.060 *** 0.117 ***
0.015 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.053 0.018 0.044 0.020 0.032 0.054 0.053 0.033 0.038 0.020 0.025
ed3 -0.124 *** -0.085 ** -0.111 *** -0.165 *** 0.036 -0.113 *** -0.113 *** -0.146 *** -0.107 *** -0.039 -0.088 -0.170 *** -0.051 -0.063 *** -0.221 ***
0.015 0.038 0.019 0.037 0.076 0.034 0.025 0.034 0.032 0.119 0.066 0.027 0.047 0.015 0.031
media -0.017 *** 0.003 -0.026 * -0.025 * 0.030 0.006 -0.032 ** -0.018 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.007 -0.013 -0.002 -0.038 ***
0.006 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.022 0.007 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.029 0.015 0.011 0.033 0.002 0.009
friend1 -0.119 *** -0.146 *** -0.130 *** -0.110 *** -0.182 *** -0.125 *** -0.123 *** -0.080 *** -0.019 -0.154 *** 0.000 -0.077 *** -0.142 ** -0.002 -0.078 ***
0.011 0.034 0.018 0.023 0.041 0.014 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.047 0.063 0.026 0.066 0.024 0.027
friend2 -0.199 *** -0.324 *** -0.173 *** -0.272 *** -0.315 *** -0.301 *** -0.227 *** -0.148 *** -0.130 *** -0.256 ** 0.005 -0.085 ** -0.320 *** -0.030 * -0.107 ***
0.018 0.037 0.037 0.058 0.050 0.041 0.038 0.049 0.020 0.055 0.064 0.036 0.041 0.018 0.033
racist 0.129 *** 0.000 0.124 *** 0.120 *** 0.024 0.027 ** 0.120 *** 0.018 0.102 *** 0.114 ** -0.001 0.173 *** 0.115 *** 0.107 *** 0.212 ***
0.012 0.042 0.023 0.018 0.036 0.013 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.054 0.038 0.030 0.028 0.013 0.034
citizen 0.071 ** -0.045 0.127 *** -0.012 0.317 ** 0.135 * -0.090 0.220 *** 0.149 *** f(1) 0.070 -0.031 0.071 0.000 0.118
0.033 0.115 0.025 0.124 0.106 0.077 0.102 0.080 0.039 0.070 0.102 0.234 0.035 0.124
ethnic 0.018 0.099 * -0.092 0.086 -0.189 ** -0.263 ** 0.081 -0.085 *** -0.104 * 0.513 * -0.168 * 0.061 0.010 0.020 0.058
0.033 0.052 0.053 0.113 0.082 0.111 0.090 0.026 0.056 0.208 0.093 0.068 0.092 0.071 0.079
fparent -0.051 ** 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.077 -0.130 *** -0.080 ** 0.096 -0.101 -0.090 -0.079 * -0.106 0.028 -0.063
0.022 0.026 0.038 0.057 0.083 0.057 0.046 0.036 0.075 0.100 0.061 0.045 0.121 0.036 0.048
female -0.009 -0.002 -0.051 ** -0.063 * 0.031 -0.092 *** 0.036 -0.049 ** -0.040 * 0.031 0.021 -0.047 0.066 -0.020 0.015
0.013 0.030 0.023 0.034 0.036 0.027 0.042 0.024 0.022 0.046 0.046 0.030 0.043 0.015 0.018
age 0.001 *** 0.005 *** 0.002 ** 0.003 *** 0.000 0.007 *** 0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
log pseudolikelihood -10616.928 -677.381 -1185.497 -751.032 -473.164 -1011.149 -661.593 -535.131 -819.780 -270.533 -404.639 -1154.325 -508.906 -594.505 -991.701
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.110 0.104 0.081 0.084 0.069 0.117 0.118 0.131 0.052 0.098 0.058 0.055 0.089 0.089 0.136
R²p 0.279 0.211 0.092 0.198 0.228 0.280 0.202 0.062 0.023 0.096 0.175 0.068 0.083 0.009 0.272
Sum of PCP 1.341 1.304 1.177 1.264 1.257 1.334 1.295 1.158 1.061 1.171 1.180 1.136 1.170 1.032 1.316
obs. 17640.000 1123.000 1979.000 1197.000 734.000 1663.000 1112.000 1280.000 1419.000 480.000 620.000 1820.000 837.000 1697.000 1666.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 6
(a) Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: those who thought that immigration would depress wages on average
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ -0.002 -0.172 ** -0.069 0.000 -0.108 0.002 0.086 0.002 0.021 0.058 -0.074 0.083 0.027 0.013 -0.002
0.038 0.073 0.084 0.149 0.121 0.067 0.144 0.020 0.072 0.121 0.149 0.093 0.042 0.138 0.058
unemploy 0.090 *** 0.018 0.102 0.151 0.137 0.044 0.102 -0.014 0.002 0.147 * 0.026 0.138 -0.117 -0.092 -0.030
0.030 0.125 0.064 0.166 0.092 0.038 0.084 0.063 0.082 0.081 0.249 0.188 0.094 0.084 0.069
isb 0.004 0.072 * -0.003 -0.131 0.004 -0.065 0.021 0.011 ** -0.071 * -0.028 0.237 ** 0.008 0.008 -0.022 -0.054
0.013 0.037 0.024 0.082 0.032 0.042 0.025 0.005 0.038 0.158 0.092 0.051 0.014 0.052 0.051
relinc -0.005 -0.008 0.008 -0.023 0.030 -0.024 -0.019 0.001 -0.008 -0.072 -0.073 0.014 0.018 ** 0.083 * 0.002
0.009 0.015 0.026 0.060 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.033 0.050 0.071 0.047 0.009 0.040 0.019
ed0 0.100 * 0.214 † † 0.154 -0.162 0.039 0.009 0.201 -0.036 0.245 -0.013 0.038 f(2) f(1)
0.049 0.109 0.098 0.132 0.109 0.039 0.158 0.153 0.196 0.264 0.104
ed1 0.055 ** 0.025 0.126 ** 0.303 *** 0.076 0.003 0.027 0.013 0.063 -0.015 0.033 0.049 -0.099 *** 0.155 0.003
0.026 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.082 0.038 0.062 0.024 0.047 0.114 0.087 0.049 0.019 0.093 0.038
ed3 -0.141 *** -0.059 -0.052 -0.175 ** 0.021 -0.064 *** -0.237 *** -0.093 *** -0.052 -0.114 -0.170 -0.142 * -0.162 * -0.083 -0.282 ***
0.036 0.125 0.052 0.078 0.110 0.017 0.037 0.038 0.088 0.249 0.125 0.088 0.092 0.123 0.070
media -0.010 0.005 -0.009 0.018 0.035 0.000 -0.018 -0.003 0.010 -0.075 0.020 0.003 -0.011 0.010 -0.021
0.009 0.039 0.023 0.039 0.032 0.021 0.026 0.012 0.019 0.051 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.026 0.014
friend1 -0.121 *** -0.001 -0.144 *** 0.047 -0.178 ** -0.132 ** -0.137 *** -0.032 -0.006 -0.230 ** 0.018 -0.056 -0.156 *** 0.033 -0.019
0.019 0.072 0.027 0.073 0.074 0.062 0.051 0.020 0.058 0.110 0.101 0.073 0.067 0.090 0.048
friend2 -0.143 *** -0.296 *** -0.139 *** -0.299 *** -0.136 -0.197 ** -0.147 * -0.064 -0.134 * -0.317 -0.006 -0.171 * -0.251 * 0.121 -0.009
0.033 0.085 0.039 0.097 0.116 0.096 0.081 0.058 0.066 0.155 0.111 0.095 0.134 0.079 0.089
racist 0.088 *** 0.002 0.103 *** 0.107 ** -0.138 *** -0.013 0.075 -0.001 0.089 ** 0.184 ** -0.093 0.198 *** 0.074 ** 0.154 *** 0.142 ***
0.018 0.063 0.035 0.044 0.027 0.022 0.053 0.018 0.037 0.076 0.057 0.054 0.039 0.044 0.036
citizen 0.087 0.341 0.232 *** -0.284 * f(5) 0.264 *** -0.077 0.165 ** -0.052 f(1) 0.247 ** -0.009 0.092 -0.188 0.047
0.055 0.219 0.066 0.122 0.082 0.105 0.100 0.102 0.110 0.215 0.187 0.285 0.198
ethnic -0.092 * 0.030 -0.189 ** 0.194 -0.113 -0.214 0.004 -0.093 *** 0.190 † -0.295 * 0.066 s(4) 0.333 -0.086
0.049 0.090 0.089 0.235 0.120 0.182 0.164 0.028 0.340 0.135 0.106 0.413 0.083
fparent -0.139 *** 0.137 ** 0.026 0.036 0.196 ** -0.058 -0.248 *** -0.094 *** 0.142 -0.377 * 0.000 -0.058 -0.003 -0.076 -0.244 ***
0.042 0.053 0.057 0.120 0.074 0.057 0.075 0.040 0.104 0.157 0.099 0.103 0.176 0.094 0.078
female 0.023 0.025 -0.036 -0.087 0.015 -0.019 0.095 ** -0.024 0.003 0.145 * 0.047 0.008 0.054 0.042 0.017
0.018 0.051 0.031 0.065 0.050 0.036 0.041 0.023 0.042 0.078 0.081 0.059 0.055 0.061 0.045
age 0.001 * 0.002 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.005 *** 0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 * 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 * 0.005 *** -0.002 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
log pseudolikelihood -3882.747 -200.353 -483.255 -141.002 -158.387 -382.446 -321.579 -342.365 -338.664 -89.348 -144.803 -218.835 -226.539 -119.628 -335.060
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.095 0.094 0.051 0.114 0.064 0.068 0.102 0.096 0.031 0.134 0.098 0.062 0.101 0.094 0.118
R²p 0.168 0.061 0.139 0.142 0.189 0.057 0.232 0.000 0.057 0.250 0.080 0.007 -0.007 0.052 0.158
Sum of PCP 1.278 1.173 1.185 1.217 1.251 1.141 1.274 1.049 1.115 1.277 1.174 1.104 1.102 1.101 1.260
obs. 6311.000 375.000 735.000 231.000 259.000 656.000 519.000 1007.000 517.000 149.000 233.000 362.000 423.000 242.000 590.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 6
(b) Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: those who did not think that immigration would depress wages on average
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ 0.043 ** -0.267 *** 0.001 -0.004 0.138 *** 0.020 -0.007 0.106 0.048 0.064 0.083 0.073 0.010 0.067 *** 0.121 **
0.021 0.061 0.036 0.073 0.051 0.067 0.074 0.091 0.033 0.056 0.111 0.049 0.100 0.023 0.059
unemploy 0.008 -0.021 0.045 -0.053 -0.026 0.062 0.047 0.036 -0.053 0.003 -0.223 -0.154 * -0.173 0.021 -0.017
0.040 0.104 0.080 0.110 0.042 0.069 0.107 0.134 0.065 0.120 0.168 0.073 0.199 0.051 0.125
isb -0.007 0.051 0.059 *** 0.016 -0.035 -0.063 *** 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.106 0.178 ** 0.038 * -0.081 -0.011 -0.097
0.013 0.057 0.021 0.047 0.031 0.022 0.029 0.019 0.021 0.075 0.083 0.022 0.056 0.019 0.064
relinc -0.008 -0.006 0.001 -0.025 -0.030 0.014 -0.018 -0.030 * 0.002 -0.027 0.043 -0.012 -0.024 -0.011 -0.003
0.006 0.032 0.007 0.029 0.040 0.010 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.025 0.047 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.012
ed0 0.069 0.166 † s(1) 0.012 0.201 0.115 -0.052 0.231 ** 0.243 f(1) -0.133 0.277 ** f(8) †
0.052 0.300 0.140 0.176 0.090 0.136 0.116 0.349 0.149 0.126
ed1 0.079 *** 0.034 0.050 0.067 -0.023 0.024 0.123 ** 0.049 0.058 * 0.212 *** 0.089 0.025 0.053 0.024 ** 0.104 ***
0.019 0.039 0.043 0.041 0.072 0.043 0.056 0.079 0.034 0.050 0.076 0.044 0.037 0.013 0.034
ed3 -0.081 *** -0.054 -0.094 *** -0.146 *** 0.064 -0.102 ** -0.020 -0.103 ** -0.075 *** 0.027 -0.066 -0.151 *** 0.037 -0.048 *** -0.150 ***
0.019 0.048 0.031 0.041 0.087 0.050 0.047 0.047 0.025 0.112 0.087 0.030 0.095 0.006 0.041
media -0.015 ** 0.000 -0.028 *** -0.027 ** 0.028 0.014 -0.037 * -0.082 ** -0.017 0.050 ** -0.022 0.012 -0.009 0.000 -0.045 ***
0.007 0.023 0.010 0.013 0.026 0.015 0.021 0.038 0.013 0.021 0.021 0.010 0.027 0.003 0.014
friend1 -0.085 *** -0.209 *** -0.100 *** -0.127 *** -0.127 *** -0.098 ** -0.074 * -0.213 ** -0.015 -0.072 0.026 -0.067 *** -0.046 -0.001 -0.075 **
0.014 0.043 0.019 0.030 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.090 0.028 0.049 0.090 0.024 0.099 0.020 0.033
friend2 -0.179 *** -0.300 *** -0.164 *** -0.243 ** -0.321 *** -0.347 *** -0.211 *** -0.175 * -0.120 *** -0.185 0.075 -0.068 * -0.226 *** -0.046 *** -0.108 **
0.018 0.035 0.044 0.077 0.059 0.015 0.033 0.092 0.016 0.048 0.087 0.035 0.047 0.015 0.048
racist 0.139 *** 0.005 0.116 *** 0.127 *** 0.123 *** 0.039 0.169 *** 0.146 * 0.103 *** 0.114 ** 0.046 0.125 *** 0.159 ** 0.090 *** 0.223 ***
0.015 0.024 0.030 0.029 0.041 0.034 0.035 0.076 0.032 0.054 0.055 0.037 0.076 0.013 0.041
citizen 0.066 * -0.192 0.084 0.174 0.102 0.020 -0.073 0.219 ** 0.156 *** ‡ -0.117 -0.087 0.068 -0.010 0.149
0.033 0.126 0.048 0.109 0.154 0.139 0.125 0.102 0.032 0.103 0.124 0.158 0.032 0.096
ethnic 0.070 0.130 ** -0.035 0.125 f(9) f(5) 0.108 -0.098 -0.153 0.605 ** -0.091 0.054 -0.163 -0.011 0.120
0.045 0.058 0.093 0.133 0.116 0.135 0.064 0.243 0.142 0.061 0.163 0.049 0.107
fparent 0.006 -0.036 0.029 0.019 -0.065 0.192 ** -0.024 -0.009 0.065 -0.121 -0.165 * -0.086 ** -0.141 0.052 * 0.039
0.019 0.036 0.048 0.068 0.119 0.085 0.028 0.073 0.066 0.071 0.084 0.039 0.172 0.034 0.057
female -0.008 0.000 -0.040 ** -0.038 0.045 -0.124 *** 0.000 -0.134 * -0.073 *** 0.014 -0.015 -0.022 0.080 -0.035 ** 0.020
0.013 0.036 0.019 0.040 0.043 0.025 0.053 0.067 0.026 0.053 0.063 0.026 0.077 0.016 0.025
age 0.001 ** 0.006 ** 0.001 0.004 *** -0.001 0.008 *** 0.003 * 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
log pseudolikelihood -5908.291 -414.856 -602.884 -559.429 -266.638 -587.701 -311.578 -147.760 -423.550 -148.456 -202.712 -853.079 -238.116 -404.340 -579.029
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.095 0.113 0.082 0.085 0.067 0.138 0.116 0.127 0.073 0.102 0.059 0.043 0.088 0.097 0.129
R²p 0.115 0.294 0.019 0.173 0.122 0.309 0.118 0.175 0.046 0.057 0.066 -0.004 0.158 0.007 0.149
Sum of PCP 1.224 1.344 1.090 1.252 1.207 1.358 1.223 1.250 1.071 1.089 1.148 1.041 1.183 1.019 1.235
obs. 10657.000 677.000 1148.000 901.000 423.000 989.000 582.000 248.000 856.000 313.000 316.000 1406.000 379.000 1356.000 1039.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
‡  All non-missing observations are 1, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 7
(a) Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: those who thought that immigration would depress wages on average
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ -0.043 -0.448 *** -0.092 0.088 -0.197 -0.019 -0.009 -0.019 -0.083 0.061 0.338 0.188 0.106 0.237 -0.218
0.055 0.161 0.147 0.294 0.155 0.158 0.158 0.025 0.104 0.370 0.187 0.186 0.052 0.373 0.213
employ x isb 0.038 0.250 ** 0.025 -0.089 0.061 0.023 0.085 0.018 0.133 0.011 -0.454 * -0.115 -0.086 * -0.228 0.210
0.042 0.126 0.131 0.219 0.107 0.137 0.094 0.019 0.128 0.312 0.265 0.202 0.044 0.213 0.206
unemploy 0.117 ** 0.099 0.040 -0.570 0.271 * -0.091 0.244 ** -0.080 -0.058 -0.631 *** ∆ 0.326 0.055 0.114 0.143
0.055 0.194 0.130 0.113 0.102 0.130 0.084 0.122 0.282 0.069 0.064 0.184 0.353 0.180
unemploy x isb -0.025 -0.073 0.053 1.011 -0.146 ** 0.122 -0.155 ** 0.047 0.060 1.413 *** ∆ -0.412 -0.174 -0.236 -0.195
0.043 0.183 0.087 0.691 0.073 0.084 0.065 0.035 0.263 0.328 0.349 0.140 0.222 0.202
isb 0.004 0.025 -0.015 -0.133 0.016 -0.083 ** 0.024 0.004 -0.097 ** -0.103 0.265 *** 0.026 0.026 0.015 -0.065
0.013 0.038 0.033 0.081 0.029 0.039 0.021 0.004 0.047 0.177 0.098 0.057 0.020 0.048 0.061
relinc -0.004 -0.015 0.007 -0.023 0.035 -0.024 -0.019 0.001 -0.014 -0.073 -0.073 0.016 0.025 *** 0.094 ** 0.000
0.009 0.011 0.025 0.059 0.022 0.020 0.016 0.008 0.027 0.045 0.071 0.047 0.009 0.041 0.020
ed0 0.100 * 0.218 † † 0.138 -0.174 0.041 0.012 0.204 -0.012 0.245 -0.012 0.046 f(2) f(1)
0.049 0.099 0.095 0.136 0.109 0.037 0.160 0.163 0.195 0.263 0.105
ed1 0.054 ** 0.024 0.128 ** 0.303 *** 0.064 0.002 0.028 0.014 0.068 -0.023 0.040 0.047 -0.094 *** 0.149 -0.002
0.026 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.079 0.037 0.062 0.025 0.049 0.118 0.088 0.049 0.017 0.094 0.039
ed3 -0.142 *** -0.066 -0.052 -0.170 ** -0.001 -0.065 *** -0.241 *** -0.092 *** -0.054 -0.103 -0.151 -0.142 * -0.162 * -0.090 -0.286 ***
0.036 0.134 0.052 0.083 0.110 0.017 0.035 0.040 0.088 0.244 0.126 0.087 0.089 0.121 0.068
media -0.010 0.005 -0.009 0.017 0.036 0.000 -0.018 -0.003 0.010 -0.087 * 0.021 0.005 -0.012 0.014 -0.022
0.009 0.040 0.022 0.038 0.032 0.021 0.026 0.012 0.020 0.051 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.025 0.014
friend1 -0.122 *** 0.000 -0.143 *** 0.037 -0.185 ** -0.132 ** -0.135 *** -0.033 -0.006 -0.211 * 0.029 -0.059 -0.157 *** 0.026 -0.019
0.019 0.073 0.026 0.075 0.077 0.064 0.051 0.021 0.059 0.106 0.103 0.072 0.066 0.084 0.047
friend2 -0.144 *** -0.324 *** -0.139 *** -0.315 *** -0.140 -0.197 ** -0.142 * -0.061 -0.135 * -0.311 0.007 -0.173 * -0.265 ** 0.115 -0.016
0.033 0.083 0.040 0.096 0.114 0.094 0.081 0.054 0.066 0.171 0.112 0.095 0.136 0.075 0.089
racist 0.088 *** 0.008 0.101 *** 0.100 ** -0.138 *** -0.016 0.073 0.000 0.091 ** 0.199 *** -0.097 * 0.198 *** 0.074 ** 0.151 *** 0.144 ***
0.018 0.064 0.033 0.044 0.027 0.023 0.053 0.019 0.036 0.077 0.058 0.053 0.037 0.049 0.035
citizen 0.083 0.357 * 0.238 *** -0.283 * f(5) 0.263 *** -0.078 0.167 * -0.059 f(1) 0.264 ** -0.008 0.089 -0.235 0.032
0.055 0.211 0.066 0.121 0.080 0.098 0.106 0.103 0.110 0.219 0.181 0.318 0.195
ethnic -0.092 * 0.055 -0.186 * 0.195 -0.080 -0.214 0.001 -0.093 *** 0.186 † -0.302 ** 0.073 s(4) 0.388 -0.095
0.048 0.089 0.093 0.233 0.130 0.183 0.161 0.027 0.342 0.133 0.105 0.450 0.082
fparent -0.140 *** 0.142 ** 0.027 0.041 0.201 ** -0.058 -0.251 *** -0.093 *** 0.146 -0.438 * 0.009 -0.057 -0.008 -0.077 -0.245 ***
0.043 0.051 0.055 0.120 0.073 0.057 0.075 0.041 0.102 0.138 0.100 0.105 0.182 0.099 0.078
female 0.023 0.023 -0.038 -0.087 0.007 -0.021 0.093 ** -0.023 0.005 0.154 ** 0.056 0.011 0.048 0.036 0.015
0.018 0.049 0.030 0.066 0.049 0.038 0.041 0.023 0.043 0.073 0.082 0.059 0.051 0.059 0.044
age 0.001 * 0.002 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 0.005 *** 0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 * 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 * 0.005 *** -0.002 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
log pseudolikelihood -3881.680 -198.120 -483.073 -140.281 -156.771 -381.804 -320.874 -340.813 -338.247 -85.535 -143.813 -218.326 -225.448 -118.934 -333.964
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.095 0.104 0.051 0.118 0.074 0.070 0.104 0.101 0.032 0.171 0.104 0.065 0.105 0.099 0.121
R²p 0.169 0.071 0.148 0.142 0.178 0.066 0.248 -0.016 0.023 0.236 0.100 -0.023 0.000 0.052 0.153
Sum of PCP 1.279 1.236 1.193 1.217 1.254 1.151 1.290 1.047 1.093 1.267 0.189 1.076 1.119 1.101 1.257
obs. 6311.000 375.000 735.000 231.000 259.000 656.000 519.000 1007.000 517.000 149.000 233.000 362.000 423.000 242.000 590.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
∆  The variable is dropped in estimation due to perfect multicollinearity without 4 perfectly predicting observations: see Stata reference, technical notes on "logit", pp.98-101 (second case).
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 7
(b) Probit estimates of marginal effects evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: those who did not think that immigration would depress wages on average
EU AT DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
employ -0.005 -0.238 0.068 0.102 -0.127 0.196 *** 0.019 0.089 0.118 0.042 0.362 0.202 * -0.018 0.117 ** -0.098
0.037 0.214 0.055 0.116 0.092 0.049 0.160 0.094 0.178 0.147 0.190 0.124 0.074 0.078 0.141
employ x isb 0.045 -0.031 -0.062 -0.102 0.204 *** -0.206 ** -0.024 0.025 -0.070 0.024 -0.285 -0.111 0.031 -0.032 0.218
0.034 0.211 0.048 0.105 0.069 0.085 0.102 0.056 0.147 0.160 0.225 0.094 0.044 0.038 0.159
unemploy 0.069 -0.463 0.399 *** -0.144 0.248 ** 0.150 -0.027 -0.439 ** -0.144 -0.049 0.485 -0.237 * -0.311 -0.070 0.703 **
0.069 0.254 0.089 0.136 0.095 0.182 0.174 0.132 0.085 0.168 0.604 0.082 0.222 0.031 0.067
unemploy x isb -0.050 0.568 -0.223 *** 0.092 -0.267 *** -0.092 0.062 0.446 *** 0.125 0.057 -0.891 0.107 0.198 0.124 -1.188 **
0.041 0.618 0.041 0.100 0.102 0.174 0.089 0.130 0.144 0.148 1.302 0.147 0.204 0.076 0.466
isb -0.011 0.049 0.098 *** 0.022 -0.074 ** -0.029 ** -0.003 -0.015 0.003 -0.116 0.209 ** 0.046 * -0.089 -0.013 -0.120 **
0.014 0.071 0.023 0.050 0.032 0.015 0.027 0.015 0.037 0.088 0.091 0.025 0.056 0.020 0.049
relinc -0.008 -0.006 0.001 -0.024 -0.024 0.016 * -0.018 -0.028 0.003 -0.027 0.043 -0.011 -0.026 -0.010 -0.002
0.005 0.033 0.008 0.029 0.038 0.009 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.047 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.013
ed0 0.066 0.167 † s(1) 0.012 0.205 0.118 -0.032 0.223 ** 0.249 f(1) -0.129 0.277 * f(8) †
0.052 0.293 0.134 0.171 0.088 0.132 0.115 0.346 0.151 0.133
ed1 0.080 *** 0.030 0.060 0.067 -0.008 0.022 0.122 ** 0.072 0.057 * 0.210 *** 0.083 0.022 0.052 0.025 ** 0.107 ***
0.018 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.068 0.042 0.055 0.077 0.031 0.051 0.077 0.044 0.039 0.012 0.033
ed3 -0.080 *** -0.050 -0.095 *** -0.149 *** 0.064 -0.103 ** -0.022 -0.095 ** -0.074 ** 0.024 -0.055 -0.153 *** 0.042 -0.047 *** -0.149 ***
0.019 0.051 0.029 0.042 0.087 0.049 0.048 0.046 0.026 0.112 0.088 0.030 0.098 0.005 0.041
media -0.016 ** 0.000 -0.029 ** -0.028 ** 0.021 0.012 -0.037 * -0.080 ** -0.017 0.049 ** -0.024 0.012 -0.010 0.000 -0.047 ***
0.007 0.023 0.011 0.013 0.023 0.016 0.021 0.037 0.013 0.021 0.022 0.010 0.027 0.004 0.014
friend1 -0.085 *** -0.208 *** -0.099 *** -0.127 *** -0.126 *** -0.095 ** -0.074 * -0.224 *** -0.016 -0.072 0.025 -0.068 *** -0.045 -0.001 -0.079 **
0.014 0.041 0.020 0.031 0.047 0.040 0.040 0.084 0.029 0.049 0.091 0.025 0.102 0.020 0.032
friend2 -0.179 *** -0.299 *** -0.170 *** -0.245 *** -0.327 *** -0.351 *** -0.214 *** -0.194 ** -0.119 *** -0.185 0.076 -0.068 * -0.222 *** -0.044 *** -0.110 **
0.018 0.035 0.043 0.077 0.061 0.017 0.031 0.092 0.015 0.047 0.087 0.035 0.046 0.014 0.045
racist 0.140 *** 0.002 0.118 *** 0.128 *** 0.131 *** 0.034 0.170 *** 0.143 * 0.104 *** 0.115 ** 0.045 0.125 *** 0.155 ** 0.093 *** 0.223 ***
0.015 0.020 0.031 0.028 0.040 0.033 0.035 0.074 0.032 0.054 0.055 0.037 0.076 0.012 0.041
citizen 0.065 * -0.188 0.094 * 0.181 0.085 ** 0.025 -0.063 0.231 ** 0.158 *** ‡ -0.099 -0.085 0.072 -0.011 0.151
0.033 0.126 0.045 0.106 0.159 0.141 0.118 0.104 0.030 0.106 0.123 0.157 0.033 0.088
ethnic 0.070 0.132 ** -0.041 0.136 f(9) f(5) 0.108 -0.068 -0.164 * 0.601 ** -0.099 0.055 -0.148 -0.007 0.119
0.045 0.060 0.095 0.133 0.116 0.142 0.047 0.235 0.141 0.061 0.157 0.048 0.106
fparent 0.007 -0.037 0.033 0.017 -0.061 0.190 ** -0.023 -0.013 0.068 -0.122 -0.156 * -0.086 ** -0.139 0.048 * 0.037
0.019 0.034 0.046 0.069 0.125 0.081 0.028 0.077 0.066 0.073 0.085 0.039 0.168 0.032 0.059
female -0.008 0.001 -0.033 -0.037 0.035 -0.119 *** 0.001 -0.119 * -0.071 *** 0.015 -0.007 -0.021 0.079 -0.035 ** 0.018
0.013 0.035 0.020 0.040 0.046 0.027 0.052 0.065 0.026 0.053 0.063 0.026 0.076 0.016 0.024
age 0.001 ** 0.006 ** 0.001 0.004 *** -0.001 0.008 *** 0.003 * 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
log pseudolikelihood -5904.455 -414.197 -597.226 -558.850 -260.502 -585.576 -311.356 -146.029 -422.739 -148.411 -202.009 -851.886 -237.864 -402.822 -573.789
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.095 0.115 0.090 0.086 0.089 0.141 0.117 0.138 0.074 0.102 0.062 0.044 0.089 0.101 0.137
R²p 0.110 0.291 0.035 0.163 0.081 0.289 0.124 0.185 0.051 0.057 0.051 -0.006 0.163 0.028 0.165
Sum of PCP 1.220 1.341 1.112 1.243 1.177 1.339 1.232 1.255 1.077 1.089 1.139 1.038 1.190 1.041 1.257
obs. 10657.000 677.000 1148.000 901.000 423.000 989.000 582.000 248.000 856.000 313.000 316.000 1406.000 379.000 1356.000 1039.000
†  All non-missing observations are 0, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
‡  All non-missing observations are 1, and the corresponding variable is dropped in estimation.
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.
For EU, a further weight adjustment is made to reflect the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
For EU, 13 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.Table 8
Probit estimates of the effects of employ and unemploy evaluated at the means of explanatory variables: re-estimating the EU equation in Table 4 (excluding  isb) sector by sector
a. agriculture, hunting, forestry d. manufacturing e. electricity, gas, water supply f. construction g. wholesale/retail trade, repair of motor
   vehicles and personal/household goods
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
employ -0.046 -0.108 -0.042 -0.018 -0.020 0.004 0.250 -0.207 s(2) 0.060 0.028 0.148 ** 0.033 -0.012 0.095 *
0.064 0.069 0.080 0.059 0.113 0.076 0.234 0.152 0.056 0.094 0.068 0.042 0.077 0.055
unemploy -0.046 0.063 -0.302 *** 0.091 * 0.166 ** -0.001 0.102 f(1) 0.297 * 0.174 ** 0.039 0.283 ** 0.081 -0.010 0.100
0.093 0.095 0.057 0.052 0.071 0.076 0.262 0.210 0.074 0.105 0.119 0.050 0.086 0.108
log pseudolikelihood -597.292 -239.651 -231.929 -2160.335 -849.757 -1165.849 -78.528 -17.108 -28.937 -765.825 -319.064 -363.602 -1504.710 -553.108 -820.300
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.126 0.174 0.172 0.097 0.102 0.088 0.308 0.555 0.478 0.120 0.136 0.147 0.116 0.117 0.119
R²p 0.233 0.068 0.313 0.292 0.169 0.127 0.294 0.480 0.233 0.267 0.101 0.221 0.303 0.119 0.123
Sum of PCP 1.368 1.276 1.346 1.312 1.271 1.232 1.365 1.564 1.416 1.310 1.224 1.291 1.334 1.255 1.233
obs. 990.000 486.000 435.000 3472.000 1389.000 1956.000 177.000 58.000 90.000 1257.000 567.000 656.000 2489.000 926.000 1476.000
h. hotels, restaurants i. transport, storage, communication j. financial intermediation k. real estate/renting/business l. public administration, defence,
   activities    compulsory social security
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
employ 0.103 0.286 ** 0.038 0.019 -0.072 0.093 0.125 0.260 0.074 -0.019 0.054 -0.033 -0.076 s(1) 0.059
0.088 0.086 0.078 0.076 0.153 0.090 0.139 0.221 0.120 0.055 0.103 0.059 0.135 0.152
unemploy -0.060 0.121 -0.201 *** -0.079 -0.156 0.011 -0.097 0.389 *** -0.225 ** 0.079 0.220 ** 0.015 0.395 *** 0.233 0.476 ***
0.072 0.123 0.043 0.108 0.151 0.148 0.145 0.067 0.058 0.087 0.092 0.093 0.097 0.110 0.142
log pseudolikelihood -393.957 -130.113 -188.073 -741.708 -268.944 -415.953 -319.518 -97.736 -182.221 -927.933 -239.084 -614.894 -730.022 -238.851 -401.225
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.256 0.342 0.263 0.117 0.160 0.100 0.153 0.209 0.160 0.150 0.197 0.153 0.139 0.148 0.137
R²p 0.388 0.272 0.166 0.318 0.215 0.186 0.255 0.217 0.184 0.149 0.386 0.041 0.334 0.166 0.156
Sum of PCP 1.429 1.443 1.346 1.344 1.352 1.271 1.333 1.301 1.297 1.287 1.391 1.213 1.386 1.334 1.282
obs. 784.000 296.000 437.000 1229.000 469.000 722.000 575.000 181.000 370.000 1693.000 434.000 1200.000 1255.000 423.000 783.000
m. education n. health/social work o. other community/social/personal service p. household activities
   activities
i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii i ii iii
employ 0.076 -0.082 0.133 0.002 -0.147 0.034 -0.015 -0.293 ** 0.017 0.260 * 0.245 *** 0.414 ***
0.091 0.171 0.122 0.086 0.191 0.079 0.086 0.124 0.080 0.120 0.063 0.178
unemploy 0.164 0.355 ** -0.047 -0.062 -0.086 -0.116 0.020 -0.168 -0.018 -0.332 * -0.682 *** f(5)
0.117 0.127 0.103 0.090 0.144 0.061 0.095 0.143 0.138 0.132 0.102
log pseudolikelihood -761.198 -209.113 -454.197 -1181.794 -288.439 -737.163 -542.175 -133.208 -314.110 -132.186 -61.373 -20.440
McFadden's (1974) LRI 0.134 0.159 0.159 0.123 0.182 0.133 0.186 0.318 0.212 0.159 0.212 0.535
R²p 0.113 0.280 -0.012 0.102 0.211 0.027 0.250 0.210 0.181 0.200 -0.100 0.260
Sum of PCP 1.246 1.286 1.136 1.233 1.269 1.159 1.345 1.338 1.339 1.217 1.111 1.445
obs. 1493.000 359.000 1070.000 2108.000 510.000 1501.000 988.000 295.000 647.000 227.000 125.000 72.000
i  Full sample
ii  Those who thought that immigration would reduce wages and salaries on average
iii  Those who did not think that immigration would decrease wages and salaries on average
s(n)  n observations predict success perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
f(n)  n observations predict failure perfectly, and the corresponding variable and the n observations are dropped in estimation.
* 10%   ** 5%   *** 1%
Categories b (fishing) and c (mining, quarrying) are omitted due to the small number of observations.
The three goodness-of-fit measures are described in Verbeek (2004: 194-197).  Sum of PCP is the sum of the proportions of correct predictions for anti = 1 and anti = 0.
Sampling weights provided by ESS are applied in maximum likelihood estimation.  The adjustment reflects the population size of each country.
Estimated standard errors are based on the assumption that observations are not necessarily independent within each region of a country, but are independent across regions of the country.
14 country dummies are included with UK being the reference.  (NB: Belgium is included because isb is not used.)
The full results are available from the author upon request.